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CONSERVATIVE ERAS IN SUPREME COURT
DECISION-MAKING: EMPLOYMENT DIVISION V
SMITH, JUDICIAL RESTRAINT, AND
NEOCONSERVATISM
Stephen M Feldman*

INTRODUCTION

Commentators often describe Employment Division v. Smith as the

beginning of a new era in free exercise decision-making.' Before
Smith, the Supreme Court typically articulated and applied a strict
scrutiny standard to resolve free exercise exemption claims. After
Smith, the Court no longer applied this supposedly rigorous test.
Instead, the Court deferred to the political process, upholding any
reasonable law of general applicability.
From a doctrinal standpoint, this description of Smith is perfectly
accurate and informative. In this Essay, though, I argue that from a
legal-political standpoint an alternative description of Smith is equally
From this latter perspective, Smith manifests the
enlightening.
culmination of one type of judicial conservatism-a traditionalist
conservatism that had been developing since the 1970s. Judicial
restraint and deference to legislative institutions were the interrelated
hallmarks of this traditionalist movement. Soon after the Court decided
Smith, however, a new form of conservatism began to take hold of the
Court. Under this neoconservatism, the aggressive and confident
assertion of moral and religious values became as important as judicial
restraint, if not more so. 2 While Smith has not been repudiated, it now
* Jerry W. Housel/Carl F. Arnold Distinguished Professor of Law and Adjunct Professor of
Political Science, University of Wyoming.
1 494 U.S. 872 (1990); see William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise
Revisionism, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 308 (1990) (defending Smith); Michael W. McConnell, Free
Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109 (1990) (criticizing Smith).
2 Neoconservative texts and helpful sources discussing neoconservatism include the
following: DANIEL BELL, THE CULTURAL CONTRADICTIONS OF CAPITALISM (1978); ALLAN

BLOOM, THE CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN MIND (1987); FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, AMERICA AT THE
CROSSROADS (2006) [hereinafter FUKUYAMA, CROSSROADS]; NATHAN GLAZER, AFFIRMATIVE
DISCRIMINATION: ETHNIC INEQUALITY AND PUBLIC POLICY (1978); JACOB HEILBRUNN, THEY
KNEW THEY WERE RIGHT (2008) [HEILBRUNN, RIGHT]; GERTRUDE HIMMELFARB, POVERTY
AND COMPASSION (1991); IRVING KRISTOL, NEOCONSERVATISM: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF AN
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seems almost a relic of an earlier and tamer conservative era when
compared to the neoconservative decisions of the last two decades. 3
For many years after World War II, conservatives split mostly into
two camps: traditionalists and libertarians. Traditionalist conservatives,
such as Russell Kirk, expressed a Burkean reverence for tradition and
religion as sources of values. 4 They preferred minimal or restrained
government, but they brooded that individuals would abuse liberty and
become licentious.5 Libertarian conservatives, inspired by Friedrich
Hayek's Road to Serfdom, emphasized the protection of individual
liberties, especially economic liberties. 6 They worried little about
license and, for that reason, they stressed minimal government above all
else.7 From the 1960s through the mid-1980s, judicial conservatism
tended to favor the traditionalist approach. For example, during the
later part of his brief career, Alexander Bickel reasoned that, because of
the nation's diverse population, American democracy necessarily
recognized a plurality of values-a de facto ethical relativism-but
democracy and civil society nonetheless could not survive without "a
foundation of moral values." 8 "A valueless politics and valueless
institutions are shameful and shameless and, what is more, man's nature
is such that he finds them, and life with and under them,
insupportable." 9 But where, then, do Americans discover their moral
values? We must "find our visions of good and evil," Bickel asserted,
"in the experience of the past, in our tradition, in the secular religion of
the American republic." 10
Previously, Bickel had argued that the Court should decide cases
based on neutral principles," but the later Bickel questioned the
existence of such principles. After all, how could a principle (or value)

IDEA (1995); DOUGLAS MURRAY, NEOCONSERVATISM: WHY WE NEED IT (2006); GEORGE H.
NASH, THE CONSERVATIVE INTELLECTUAL MOVEMENT IN AMERICA SINCE 1945 (2008);
NORMAN PODHORETZ, THE NORMAN PODHORETZ READER (Thomas L. Jeffers ed., 2004); THE

NEOCON READER (Irwin Stelzer ed., 2004); Peter Berkowitz, Introduction, in VARIETIES OF
CONSERVATISM INAMERICA xiii (2004); Francis Fukuyama, The End of History?, NAT'L INT.
Summer 1989, at 3, available at http://www.wesjones.com/eoh.htm; Jacob Heilbrunn,
Neoconservatism, in VARIETIES OF CONSERVATISM IN AMERICA 105 (Peter Berkowitz ed., 2004)

[hereinafter Heilbrunn, Neoconservatism].
3 See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (invalidating the Violence
Against Women Act).
4 NASH, supra note 2, at 104-15; Adam Wolfson, Conservatives and Neoconservatives, in
THENEOCON READER, supra note 2, at 213, 217.
5 Berkowitz, supra note 2, at xiv-xvi; Heilbrunn, Neoconservatism, supra note 2, at 107.
6 FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944); Wolfson, supra note 4, at 216,
221.

7 Berkowitz, supra note 2, at xvii-xviii.
8 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 23 (1975).
9 Id. at 24.
10 Id.
II ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 25-26, 49-59 (2d ed. 1986).

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2566287
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have any substantive content yet be neutral? 12 Moreover, according to
Bickel, the Court should stop trying to decide cases that would chart the
course of societal "progress."l 3 Numerous Warren Court decisions,
including Brown v. Board of Education,14 were failing to achieve their
social-engineering goals.' 5 Instead, Bickel maintained, the decisions
were "heading toward obsolescence, and in large measure
abandonment."' 6 Societal change was necessarily slow-tradition
evolved gradually' 7-and small adjustments to social values and
policies were to be made through "the political process" rather than
through the courts.' 8 Ultimately, then, Bickel called for judicial
restraint: In most circumstances, the Court should defer to "the political
institutions" and allow them to engage in "policy-making."' 9 When the
Burger Court decided Roe v. Wade, 20 holding that a constitutional right
of privacy protected a woman's interest in choosing whether to have an
abortion, Bickel unsurprisingly agreed with the dissenting view: The
decision was illegitimate because it was "legislative rather than judicial
action." 2 1
What, then, is neoconservatism?
A fruitful approach to
neoconservatism distinguishes between two forms and epochs of
American democracy: republican and pluralist. From the framing
through the 1920s, American government was republican democratic:
supposedly virtuous citizens and officials pursued the common good
rather than their private interests. 22 In the 1930s, pluralist democracy
While
supplanted the collapsing republican democratic regime.
republican democracy was grounded on the traditional values embodied
in the concepts of virtue and the common good, pluralist democracy
accepted ethical relativism. Thus, individuals and competing interest
groups could press their diverse interests and values in the democratic
arena. From this array of asserted interests and values, the government
would pursue those goals that emerged through certain established
processes. No higher standards or principles (such as virtue and the
12 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 99, 165
(1978); see Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Alexander M Bickel and the Post-Realist Constitution, 11
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 521, 551-53, 556 (1976) (explaining that Bickel lost faith in neutral
principles).
13 BICKEL, supra note 12, at 13; see id. at 103 (giving examples).

14 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
15
16
17
18

BICKEL, supra note 12, at 148-51, 165, 173.
Id. at 173.
Id. at 175; Purcell, supra note 12, at 552.
BICKEL, supra note 8, at 25.
19 Id at 25-26.
20 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
21 BICKEL, supra note 8, at 28 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 171, 174 (1973)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting)).
22 See STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, FREE EXPRESSION AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA: A
HISTORY 14-45, 153-208 (2008) (discussing republican democracy).
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common good) limited the interests, values, and goals that could be
urged. Legitimacy arose by following the proper procedures or
processes. 23
Neoconservatism, first emerging in the 1960s, achieved
prominence in the late 1970s and early 1980s by leading an assault on
Advocating for a
the hegemonic pluralist democratic regime.
resurrection of republican democracy, neoconservatives relied on both
reason and tradition. Reason could help them discern the universal
truths and values supposedly comprising virtue and the common good,
while tradition and religion could help them inculcate such suitable
values in the public. 24 Armed with these tools, neocons were confident
and aggressive: They believed they had identified the best form of
American government; they believed they knew the values or virtues
that would support such a government; and they believed they could
design domestic and foreign policies that would cultivate the desired
values and form of government. Thus, neocons willingly accepted an
assertive government so long as it pursued the conservative goals
manifested in the concepts of virtue and the common good.25 Skeptical
of liberal domestic policies, neocons emphasized that such policies,
while often engendered by good intentions, nonetheless brought
unanticipated negative results. 26
Part I of this Essay focuses on the early writings of constitutional
scholar Robert Bork as exemplifying traditionalist conservative
constitutional theory. 27 Part II discusses how Smith manifests the
application of this form of constitutional theory in the realm of the Free
Exercise Clause. 28 Part III returns to Bork but focuses on his later
writings, which were infused with neoconservative themes. 29 Part IV
explores how the post-Smith Court has followed a more neoconservative
approach in hybrid free exercise-free expression cases. 30 The
Conclusion compares traditionalist and neoconservative approaches of
constitutional law, first emphasizing the differences and then the
similarities.31

23 See id. at 291-348 (discussing pluralist democracy).
24 Berkowitz, supra note 2, at xxi-xxii; Heilbrunn, Neoconservatism, supra note 2, at 105,

123-26.
25 Wolfson, supra note 4, at 223-24.
26 E.g., GLAZER, supra note 2 (criticizing liberal affirmative action programs).

27 See infra text accompanying notes 32-45.
28 See infra text accompanying notes 46-59.
29 See infra text accompanying notes 60-89.
30 See infra text accompanying notes 90-137.

31 See infra text accompanying notes 138-53.
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THE EARLY BORK AND CONSERVATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY

Robert Bork, in his early writings, followed the later Bickel, his
friend and colleague on the Yale Law School faculty. Like Bickel, the
early Bork recognized the importance of ethical relativism in pluralist
democracy and even cited approvingly to the patron saint of the pluralist
democratic regime, political scientist Robert Dahl. 32 Furthermore, like
Bickel, Bork posited that a judicial reliance on neutral principles was
the only means for reconciling majority rule with minority rights, yet
found the conception of such principles to be problematic. If the
Court's exercise of judicial power could be legitimate only when the
Justices applied neutral principles, 33 Bork reasoned, then the concept of
neutrality must be pushed to its logical extreme. "[I]f a neutral judge
must demonstrate why principle X applies to cases A and B but not to
case C," Bork wrote, "he must, by the same token, also explain why the
principle is defined as X rather than as X minus, which would cover A
but not cases B and C, or as X plus, which would cover all cases, A, B
and C." 34 The crux of the matter, according to Bork, was that the Court
could never satisfy this demand for neutrality without violating the
tenets of relativism.
There is no principled way to decide that one man's gratifications are
more deserving of respect than another's or that one form of
Why is sexual
gratification is more worthy than another.
gratification more worthy than moral gratification? Why is sexual
gratification nobler than economic gratification? There is no way of
deciding these matters other than by reference to some system of
moral or ethical values that has no objective or intrinsic validity of
its own and about which men can and do differ. Where the
Constitution does not embody the moral or ethical choice, the judge
has no basis other than his own values upon which to set aside the
community judgment embodied in the statute. That, by definition, is
an inadequate basis for judicial supremacy. 35
For that reason, Bork insisted that the Court should defer to the
value choices derived through the pluralist democratic process. Thus,
the early Bork became one of the most vigorous advocates for judicial

32 Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1,
2-3 nn.4-5 (1971) [hereinafter Bork, Neutral]; see ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF

AMERICA 188 (1990) [hereinafter BORK, TEMPTING] (discussing friendship with Bickel);
ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE To DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1956) (explaining pluralist democratic
theory). Another influential writing by Bork includes ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARDS
GOMORRAH (1996) [hereinafter BORK, SLOUCHING].
33 Bork, Neutral,supra note 32, at 3.
34 Id. at 8.
35 Id at 10.
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restraint: The Court should never choose "fundamental values." 36 Such
The Court could
choices should be left to the legislatures.37
legitimately invalidate a legislative choice or action only if it conflicted
with a constitutionally protected value or right, of which there were
only two types. First, the Court should enforce any "specific values" or
"specified rights" that "text or history show the [F]ramers actually to
have intended [to protect] and which are capable of being translated into
principled rules." 38 Second, the Court should enforce "secondary or
derived individual rights" that were necessary to preserve the
constitutionally established "governmental process." 39 If the Supreme
Court Justices were to follow this originalist approach, enforcing only
these two types of rights, they would never personally choose what to
enforce. Rather, Bork emphasized, they would necessarily "stick close
to the text and the history, and their fair implications." 40
According to Bork, though, the Justices all too frequently shunned
the strictures of originalism and instead pursued an illegitimate activist
course. 4 1 Bork argued, for instance, that the Court had unjustifiably
expanded the First Amendment protection of free expression.
Categorizing free expression within the second type of rights-as a
prerequisite for democratic government-Bork insisted that only
"explicitly political" speech and writing should be constitutionally
protected. 42 Other expression is not integral to the governmental
process. From this perspective, "[t]here is no basis for judicial
intervention to protect . .. scientific, literary or that variety of
expression we call obscene or pornographic." 43 Speech or writing
should not be constitutionally protected merely because it contributes to
one's self-fulfillment. Thus, Bork underscored that the community
should be permitted to restrict pornography, even if some individuals
want to possess it. Pornography should be "seen as a problem of
pollution of the moral and aesthetic atmosphere precisely analogous to
smoke pollution," Bork explained. 44 He elaborated:

36 Id at 6, 8.
37 Id. at 10-11.
38 Id. at 17.
39 Id
40 Id at 8; Robert H. Bork, The Impossibility of Finding Welfare Rights in the Constitution,
1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 695, 695 (arguing against a right to welfare as being neither a specified right

nor a secondary right necessary to the governmental process); see RAOUL BERGER,
GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 45, 363-72 (1977) (arguing to follow the Framers' original
intentions); Steven M. Teles, Transformative Bureaucracy: Reagan's Lawyers and the Dynamics
of Political Investment, 23 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 61, 76 (2009) (emphasizing importance of

Bork's advocacy of originalism to the conservative legal movement).
41 Bork, Neutral, supra note 32, at 20-29.
42 Id. at 20.
43 Id
44 Id. at 29.
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A majority of the community may foresee that continued availability
of pornography to those who want it will inevitably affect the quality
of life for those who do not want it, altering, for example, attitudes
toward love and sex, the tone of private and public discourse and
views of social institutions such as marriage and the family. 4 5

II.

SMITH AND JUDICIAL RESTRAINT

In the usual free exercise case, the claimant seeks an exemption (or
exception) from a generally applicable law that burdens the exercise of
his or her religion. The claimant, in effect, asks the court to order the
government to accommodate religion. One typical case arose because
Air Force regulations prohibited wearing a hat or other head covering in
certain circumstances, yet religious convictions mandated that Orthodox
Jews always keep their heads covered (by wearing, for example, a
yarmulke or skull cap). Consequently, in Goldman v. Weinberger, an
Orthodox Jewish Air Force officer sought a free exercise exemption so
that he could follow his religious convictions while remaining in the Air
Force. 46 In 1963, in Sherbert v. Verner, the Court set forth a strict
scrutiny test that would remain until 1990 the presumptive standard for
resolving such cases: A state could justify a burden on an individual's
free exercise of religion only by showing that the state action was
necessary to achieve a compelling state interest. 47 Otherwise, the
government would be required to accommodate the religious practices.
In Smith, decided in 1990, the Court repudiated its longstanding
strict scrutiny test for free exercise cases. Smith belonged to the Native

American Church, whose members participate in religious rituals that
include the supervised consumption of peyote. Smith was discharged
from his job at a private drug rehabilitation clinic because his peyote
use violated the state criminal laws. The Court, by a six-to-three vote,
held that the state criminal law prohibiting the use of peyote, even for
religious purposes, did not violate the Free Exercise Clause. 4 8
Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a majority opinion, joined by four
other Justices. The First Amendment, according to Scalia, precluded all
governmental regulations of religious beliefs. Yet, it did not similarly
preclude governmental restrictions on conduct, such as the use of
peyote, even if the conduct arose from religious convictions. The
government could now punish religiously motivated conduct pursuant
to a generally applicable law without satisfying the strict scrutiny
45 Id.

46 475 U.S. 503 (1986). The Court rejected Goldman's claim.
47 374 U.S. 398 (1963).

48 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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standard. 49 Instead, the Court would allow the "political process" to fix
the scope of free exercise freedoms.5 0 After Smith, strict scrutiny would
be appropriate in only three exceptional circumstances: first, if the
government intentionally discriminated against religion; 5 1 second, if a
case challenged the denial of unemployment compensation; 52 and third,
if a case involved a "hybrid" claim, where free exercise is combined
with some other constitutional right.53 Because the first two exceptions
will be triggered only rarely, the hybrid-claims exception now appears
to be the primary means for invoking heightened judicial scrutiny in the
free exercise context. 54 As Scalia explained:
The only decisions in which we have held that the First Amendment
bars application of a neutral, generally applicable law to religiously
motivated action have involved not the Free Exercise Clause alone,
but the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional
protections, such as freedom of speech and of the press.55
The Smith decision and majority opinion exemplified the Court's
acceptance of traditionalist conservatism. Scalia suggested, in effect,
that in our pluralistic American society, the Court could not discover a
workable principle of religious freedom, neutral or otherwise.
"Precisely because 'we are a cosmopolitan nation made up of people of
almost every conceivable religious preference,' and precisely because
we value and protect that religious divergence," the Court reasoned,
"we cannot afford the luxury of deeming presumptively invalid, as
applied to the religious objector, every regulation of conduct that does
not protect an interest of the highest order." 56 If the Court were to
continue applying the strict scrutiny test in free exercise cases, it "would
be courting anarchy, [a] danger [that] increases in direct proportion to
Granting judicial
the society's diversity of religious beliefs."5 7
exemptions to generally applicable laws would allow each individual

49 Id at 882-90.
50 Id. at 890.

51 Id. at 877-78; e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S.
520 (1993) (invalidating an animal cruelty law that had been interpreted to punish killings for
religious reasons).
52 Smith, 494 U.S. at 883; see, e.g., Frazee v. Ill. Dep't of Emp't Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989)
(holding unconstitutional the denial of unemployment benefits to a Christian who refused to work
on Sundays but did not belong to an established church or sect).
53 Smith, 494 U.S. at 882; see, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (combining a
religious-freedom claim with a free-expression claim).
54 See Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SUP. CT. REV.

(discussing Smith exceptions).
55 Smith, 494 U.S. at 881.
56 Id at 888.
57 Id

1, 41
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"to become a law unto himself," or so Scalia and the majority worried. 8
Consequently, to avoid potential anarchic catastrophe, the Court moved
from its prior strict scrutiny doctrine-supposedly showing almost no
deference to the democratic process-to a doctrine without meaningful
judicial scrutiny of challenged governmental actions-showing
extraordinary deference to the legislature. In most cases after Smith,
courts would exercise judicial restraint, upholding all reasonable laws
so long as discriminatory purposes had not motivated the legislature.
Finally, Scalia did not hesitate to admit that judicial restraint in the free
exercise context would likely harm religious minorities: "It may fairly
be said that leaving accommodation to the political process will place at
a relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely
engaged in; but that [is an] unavoidable consequence of democratic
government .. . . ."59
III.

THE LATER BORK AND NEOCONSERVATIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY

While the early Bork was a traditionalist conservative, he already
displayed neoconservative leanings, evidenced by his criticisms of
liberal Supreme Court jurisprudence and his emphasis on allowing
legislatures to enforce moral values. Regardless, the later Bork fit more
comfortably into the neocon camp. 6 0 He joined the American
Enterprise Institute (AEI), started frequently citing neocon icons Irving
Kristol and Gertrude Himmelfarb, and published in neoconservative
journals. 61 Yet, the largest change between the early and later Bork lay
in his attitude toward ethical relativism. The early Bork acquiesced in
the widespread acceptance of relativism and built his theory of judicial
review upon it. The later Bork displayed unmitigated hostility toward
relativism.

58 Id. at 885 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1878)). Likewise, the
Court brooded that the strict scrutiny doctrine created "a system in which each conscience is a
law unto itself." Id. at 890.
59 Id. at 890. After Smith, Congress acted to reinstate the compelling state interest test for
laws of general applicability infringing free exercise rights. Religious Freedom Restoration Act,
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2006). In City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), the
Court invalidated RFRA as beyond congressional power, at least vis-A-vis state and local
governments.
60 See HEILBRUNN, RIGHT, supra note 2, at 158 (listing Bork as a neocon).
61 BORK, SLOUCHING, supra note 32, at 59-60, 63, 70, 160, 268, 276; BORK, TEMPTING,
supra note 32, at 321 (discussing AEI). For Bork essays in neoconservative journals, see Robert
H. Bork, Adversary Jurisprudence, NEW CRITERION, May 2002, at 4 [hereinafter Bork,
Adversary], available at 2002 WLNR 14267354; Robert H. Bork, Olympians on the March: The
Courts and the Culture Wars, NEW CRITERION, May 2004, at 5.
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The later Bork continued to argue that the Court, in exercising its
power of judicial review, must reconcile majority rule with the
protection of minority rights. 62 To do so, the judiciary must articulate
and rely on a constitutional theory that produces politically neutral
results. 6 3 The only such theory, according to Bork, is originalism. 64 As
now modified by Bork, originalism demanded that the Justices uphold
the original public meaning of the Constitution rather than the
subjective intentions of the constitutional Framers. 65 "All that counts is
how the words used in the Constitution would have been understood at
the time." 66 Ever since 1937, however, when the Court switched from a
republican to a pluralist democratic approach, the Justices have
consistently refused to be bound by originalism. 67 Instead, the Justices
have imposed a modem liberal cultural agenda that simultaneously
encompasses both "radical egalitarianism (the equality of outcomes
rather than of opportunities) and radical individualism (the drastic
reduction of limits to personal gratification)." 68
In typical
neoconservative fashion, Bork rued the 1960s counterculture for
promoting these hallmarks of liberal culture, which together engender
moral relativism. 69 Because egalitarianism "is hostile to hierarchies and
distinctions," it produces a relativist acceptance of diverse ideas and
moral values. 70
Likewise, because individualism entails "the
privatization of morality," it engenders relativism: "One person's
morality being as good as another's, the community may not adopt
moral standards in legislation." 7 1 According to Bork, these aspects of
modem liberalism have caused America's "cultural degeneration"indeed, Bork depicted a cultural disaster: 72
Sometimes the impulses of radical individualism and radical
egalitarianism cooperate. Both, for example, are antagonistic to
society's traditional morality-the individualist because his
pleasures can be maximized only by freedom from authority, the
egalitarian because he resents any distinction among people or forms
of behavior that suggests superiority in one or the other. When
egalitarianism reinforces individualism, denying the possibility that
one culture or moral view can be superior to another, the result is
62 BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 32, at 139.
63 Id. at 2, 140-41.
64 Id. at 5-6, 143-44.
65 Id. at 6, 144; see Teles, supra note 40, at 80 (arguing that Scalia first suggested that
originalism should focus on original meanings rather than original intentions).
66 BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 32, at 144.
67 Id. at 2, 6.
68 BORK, SLOUCHING, supra note 32, at 5; BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 32, at 245-46.
69 BORK, SLOUCHING, supra note 32, at 17-65; see BELL, supra note 2, at 73, 81 (criticizing
counterculture).
70 BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 32, at 245.
71 Id. at 246.
72 BORK, SLOUCHING, supra note 32, at 276.
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cultural or moral chaos, both prominent and destructive features of
our time. 73
To be clear, the later Bork claimed to know the antidote for ethical
relativism, namely: tradition and religion. While he brooded about "the
prospects for the survival of traditional American culture,"74 he insisted
that religion could supply individuals with the moral premises needed to
guide conduct. 75 "[F]or society, as a whole," Bork wrote, "the major
and perhaps only alternative to 'intellectual and moral relativism and/or
nihilism' is religious faith." 76 Moreover, various societal institutions,
including legislatures, churches, and schools, stood ready and waiting:
They could uphold and promote the religious and moral values that
prevent "rootless hedonism." 77 In fact, these societal institutions
sometimes attempted to do just that. The problem was that the Court
used its power of judicial review to invalidate many such attempts: The
Court imposed relativism on the rest of society. To Bork, almost all of
the Justices (even most Republican-appointed Justices) were members
of a liberal cultural elite, and as such, they enforced the relativist tenets
radical
of (pluralist, democratic) liberalism, encompassing
egalitarianism and individualism. "[T]he judge who looks outside the
historic Constitution always looks inside himself and nowhere else.
And when he looks inside himself he sees an intellectual, with, as often
as not, some measure of intellectual class attitudes." 78
To illustrate the Court's erroneous judicial enforcement of
relativism, Bork turned to free expression cases. In such cases, the
Court protected "self-expression, personal autonomy, or individual
gratification," rather than deferring to legislative attempts to cultivate
communal values. 79 For example, in Cohen v. California, the Court
invalidated the conviction of a defendant for disturbing the peace; the
defendant had worn in a courthouse a jacket inscribed with the message,
"Fuck the Draft."80 Bork expressed his disgust: "The majority opinion
by Justice Powell asked 'How is one to distinguish this from any other
offensive word?' and answered that no distinction could be made since
'one man's vulgarity is another's lyric."' 8 Well, not to Bork, who
recognized vulgarity for what it is-and it is not lyric. Rather than
interpreting the First Amendment to impose an individualist relativism,

73 Id. at 5.
74
75
76
77
78
79

Bork, Adversary, supra note 61.
BORK, SLOUCHING, supra note 32, at 278.
Id. at 277.
Id. at 8.
BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 32, at 242.
BORK, SLOUCHING, supra note 32, at 99.

80 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
81 BORK, SLOUCHING, supra note 32, at 99; Bork, Adversary, supra note 61.
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the Court should have allowed the community to protect itself from
offensive language. 82
Bork argued that the Court should comprehend that "in a
republican form of government where the people rule, it is crucial that
the character of the citizenry not be debased." 83 In elaborating this
position, he explicitly invoked a broken-windows type of
neoconservative argument. 84 If one broken window is left unfixed, then
community values and controls will begin to weaken and, before long,
all of the windows in the neighborhood will be shattered.85 An unfixed
broken window conveys "the message," in Bork's words, "that nobody
Before long, authority is "marginalized." 87
cares much." 86
Consequently, "Cohen was just the beginning." The Court soon held
that the First Amendment protected offensive speech uttered in other
situations: during a school board meeting, in a university chapel, and in
a confrontation with police officers.8 8
And Cohen itself, Bork
suggested, arose because of earlier broken windows that manifested an
acceptance of relativism and degradation.
The relativism of these [Supreme Court] decisions seems to reflect a
loss of will to maintain conventional standards. The Court refused to
allow punishment for the same obscene and assaultive speech that
was tolerated by supine university faculties and administrators in the
late 1960s and early 1970s. When the faculties collapsed, the
universities were corrupted; when the Supreme Court gave way, the
national culture was defiled. Now, of course, such language is
routine on television and in motion pictures.89

IV.

HYBRID FREE EXERCISE-FREE EXPRESSION CASES

When the Court decided Smith in 1990, the Justices were, in order
of seniority, as follows: William Brennan, Byron White, Thurgood
Marshall, Harry Blackmun, William Rehnquist (Chief Justice), John
Paul Stevens, Sandra Day O'Connor, Antonin Scalia, and Anthony
Kennedy. Republican presidents appointed seven of these nine Justices.
82 BORK, SLOUCHING, supra note 32, at 8, 99; BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 32, at 242; Bork,
Adversary, supranote 61.
83 BORK, SLOUCHING, supra note 32, at 141.
84 Robert H. Bork, "Thanks a Lot": Free Speech and High Schools, NAT'L REV., Apr. 16,
2007, at 24; see Bork, Adversary, supra note 61.
85 James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood
Safety, in THE NEOCON READER, supra note 2, at 149, 153-54, 158-59 (arguing that the police
should work to maintain social order and uphold community values and not merely fight crime).
86 Bork, supra note 84, at 24.
87 Id.

88 Bork, Adversary, supra note 61.
89 Id.
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Political scientists Jeffrey Segal and Albert Cover have empirically
scored Supreme Court nominees' perceived political ideologies at the
time of appointment, with .000 being most conservative (for example,
Scalia) and 1.000 being most liberal (for example, LBJ's confidant, Abe
Fortas). 90 The average score for the Justices at the time of the Smith
decision was a slightly conservative 0.41. The two most conservative
Justices, based on the Segal-Cover scores, were Scalia (at .000) and
Rehnquist (at .045, both when he was appointed Associate Justice and
Chief Justice). In the two years after Smith, the Court would move
distinctly to the right. The two most liberal Justices, Brennan and
Marshall, would retire and be replaced by conservatives, David Souter
and Clarence Thomas, respectively. While Souter would eventually
move leftward, he scored as a solid conservative .325 when appointed
and consistently voted with the conservative stalwarts, Rehnquist and
Scalia, during his first term on the Court. 91 More important, Thomas
scored an extremely conservative .160, far to the right of his
predecessor, Marshall. Indeed, three of the Justices in the early 1990s
could be fairly categorized as neoconservatives-Rehnquist, Scalia, and
Thomas-given their Segal-Cover scores, votes, and opinions. After
Thomas, the two most important appointees, in terms of their legalpolitical viewpoints, were John Roberts and Samuel Alito. The
appointment of Roberts (Segal-Cover score: .120) to replace Rehnquist
as Chief Justice assured continuing the strong conservative leadership of
the Court. Perhaps more significant, the even more conservative Alito
(Segal-Cover score: .100) replaced the moderately conservative
O'Connor (Segal-Cover score: .415) and thus shifted the Court
rightward. With Alito and Roberts joining Scalia and Thomas, four of
the Justices leaned in neoconservative directions.
Furthermore,
Kennedy, with a Segal-Cover score of .365, most often sided with the
neocons in ideologically charged cases.
In light of the Court's personnel changes after the Smith decision,
one should not be surprised to find that the Court has moved in a
neoconservative direction. To illustrate this point, I will focus on
several hybrid free exercise-free expression cases. These hybrid cases
have arisen in situations where private (non-governmental) actors have
sought to express certain religious views or values on governmentowned property. The Court decided the first one, Widmar v. Vincent, in
90 Jeffrey Segal & Albert Cover, Perceived Qualifications and Ideology of Supreme Court
Nominees, 1937-2005, http://www.sunysb.edulpolsci/jsegal/qualtable.pdf (using data drawn from
Jeffrey Segal & Albert Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes of Supreme Court Justices, 83
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 557-65 (1989), updated in LEE EPSTEIN & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, ADVICE AND
CONSENT: THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS (2005)).
91 THOMAS R. HENSLEY, THE REIHNQUIST COURT 19 (2006); see THE OXFORD COMPANION
TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 804 (Kermit L. Hall ed., 1992) (noting that

Souter, during his first term, voted with Rehnquist in eighty-six percent of the cases).
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1981, before Smith. 92 A state university opened its facilities for
meetings held by registered student organizations, but refused to allow
its buildings and grounds to be used "for purposes of religious worship
or religious teaching." 93 In this particular instance, the university
refused access to Cornerstone, a student organization of evangelical
Christians from various denominational backgrounds. 94 Cornerstone
members challenged the university policy by arguing that it violated
both their free exercise and free expression rights. The university,
meanwhile, maintained that allowing religious organizations to use its
facilities would violate the Establishment Clause. This swirl of
religious freedom and free expression claims generated an odd political
alignment of Justices. The conservative Powell wrote a majority
opinion joined by conservatives-Burger, Rehnquist, and O'Connorand liberals-Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun-that concluded that
the university policy violated free expression. The liberal Stevens
concurred in the judgment only, while the conservative White dissented.
University property ordinarily would not constitute a public
forum,9 5 but in Widmar, the Court explicitly held that "[t]hrough its
policy of accommodating their meetings, the University has created a
forum generally open for use by student groups." 96 In other words, the
university had transformed its property into a designated (or limited)
public forum. Having done so, the university could restrict speech
based on its content-here, the religious content--only if it could
satisfy the strict scrutiny standard. 97 The Court then concluded that the
university failed to offer a compelling purpose for proscribing the
religious speech. Contrary to the university's argument, the university
would not have violated the Establishment Clause if it had allowed such
speech; the university's avoidance of a specious constitutional
(Establishment Clause) violation could not amount to a compelling
purpose. 98
White, dissenting, questioned the sagacity of the Court's decision
to focus on free expression rather than free exercise. And to be sure, the
majority's emphasis on free expression and disregard for free exercise
92 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
93 Id at 265.

94 Id. at 265 n.2.
95 Government property can be divided into three categories: public forums, non-public
forums, and designated public forums. A public forum, including the streets and parks, is
government-owned property that has traditionally been held open for public speaking. All other
government-owned property is a non-public forum, unless the government has specially
designated the property for public speaking, in which case the property is transformed into a
designated or limited public forum. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perny Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S.
37, 45-47 (1983).
96 454 U.S. at 267.
97 Id. at 270.

98 Id. at 270-75.
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was significant in and of itself. White's analysis of the free exercise
claim led him to conclude that the university had not violated the First
Amendment-the university was strongly positioned vis-A-vis the Free
Exercise Clause-but once the majority turned instead toward free
expression, the university's chances seemingly diminished. 99 After all,
ever since the Court had turned to pluralist democracy in 1937, it had
treated free expression as a constitutional lodestar.100 In his opinion
concurring in the judgment, Stevens, too, criticized the majority's free
expression approach; he wondered whether the application of public
forum doctrine was appropriate. Stevens maintained that universities
must constantly decide what ideas to teach and communicate to
students, and such decisions are necessarily content-based. Applying
public-forum doctrine and its strict scrutiny standard would hamstring
university officials and professors as they attempted to structure a
curriculum and shape educational life. 101
Three more of these hybrid free exercise-free expression cases
arose after the Court decided Smith and thus also after the Court shifted
toward neoconservatism. In the next one, Lamb's Chapel v. Center
Moriches Union Free School District, decided in 1993, the Justices

predictably continued to emphasize free expression (rather than free
exercise), to apply the public forum doctrine, and to conclude that the
government must allow Christian organizations to spread their messages
on school properties. 102 In Lamb's Chapel, a public school district
opened its buildings during non-school hours for various community
uses other than religion. Pursuant to this policy, the school district
refused to allow a Christian evangelical church "to show a six-part film
series containing lectures by Doctor James Dobson."1 03 A promotional
brochure explained that "the film series would discuss Dr. Dobson's
views on the undermining influences of the media that could only be
counterbalanced by returning to traditional, Christian family values
instilled at an early stage."1 04 The Court again applied the public forum
doctrine, but unlike in Widmar, the Lamb's Chapel Court assumed
arguendo that the school district had not created a designated public
forum. Even so, the Court explained that a restriction on religious
expression in a non-public forum must be both "reasonable and
viewpoint neutral." 05 And in this case, the Court found viewpoint
discrimination: The school district permitted "school property to be
99 Id. at 282-89 (White, J., dissenting).
100 Stephen M. Feldman, The Theory and Politics of First-Amendment Protections, 8 U. PA. J.

CONST. L. 431 (2006).
101 454 U.S. at 278-80 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
102
103
104
105

508 U.S. 384, 386-88, 391-94 (1993).
Id. at 387.
Id. at 388.
Id. at 393.
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used for the presentation of all views about family issues and child
rearing except those dealing with the subject matter from a religious
standpoint."1 06 Thus, despite assuming that the school property had not
been designated a public forum, the Court still held the restriction on
religious speech to be unconstitutional.
Looking at Lamb's Chapel in conjunction with the subsequent
cases, Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia,0 7
decided in 1995, and Good News Club v. Milford Central School, 0 8

decided in 2001, two key points become evident. First, the conservative
Justices coalesced into a bloc supporting the neoconservative promotion
of overtly Christian messages in school settings. While in Lamb's
Chapel the liberal and conservative Justices still mixed together, the
Justices in Rosenberger fell into their more typical five-to-four
conservative-liberal split. Kennedy wrote a majority opinion (joined by
Rehnquist, Scalia, Thomas, and O'Connor) holding that the First
Amendment required the University of Virginia to fund a student
newspaper, Wide Awake, dedicated to evangelical "proselytizing." 09
Wide Awake explicitly challenged "Christians to live, in word and deed,
according to the faith they proclaim and to encourage students to
consider what a personal relationship with Jesus Christ means.""10 In
Good News Club, the five conservative Justices, joined by Breyer, held
that a public school violated free expression by denying access to a
private Christian organization for children that sought to hold club
meetings on school property.'
Writing for the majority, Thomas
chastised the lower court for its seeming hostility toward Christianity.
Lamb's Chapel and Rosenberger had

already

established

the

constitutional protection of Christian education and proselytizing on
public property, including schools, and the Good News Club case was
indistinguishable.11 2
Thus, Thomas wrote, "[t]he only apparent
difference between the activity of Lamb's Chapel and the activities of
the Good News Club is that the Club chooses to teach moral lessons
from a Christian perspective through live storytelling and prayer,
whereas Lamb's Chapel taught lessons through films."ll 3
Second, in these cases, the conservative Justices consistently
reached the pro-Christian result despite the vagaries of a convoluted
public forum doctrine. In Widmar, the Court held that the state
university had created a designated public forum and thus applied the
Id
107 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
108 533 U.S. 98, 103 (2001).
109 515 U.S. at 874 (Souter, J., dissenting).
110 Id. at 826 (internal quotation marks omitted).
1ll 533 U.S.at 103.
106

112 Id. at 108-12.

113 Id. at 109-10.
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strict scrutiny test ordinarily used to determine the scope of free
expression in a traditional public forum, like the streets and parks.114 In
Lamb's Chapel, the Court assumed that the school district had not
created a designated public forum and therefore claimed to apply a less
rigorous standard of judicial scrutiny. Yet, the Lamb's Chapel Court
imbued its scrutiny with such a surprising degree of bite that it reached
the same result as in Widmar: invalidating the government's restriction
on the use of its school properties.' 15 Then, in Rosenberger, the Court
again held, like in Widmar, that a state university had created a
designated public forum, but unlike in Widmar, the Court did not apply
strict scrutiny. Instead, the Rosenberger Court applied the ostensibly
less rigorous degree of scrutiny that it had articulated in Lamb's Chapel.
Suddenly, the Court's initial finding of whether the government had
created a designated public forum no longer appeared to determine the
Court's level of scrutiny. Even so, just as in Lamb 's Chapel, the
Rosenberger Court imbued its scrutiny with bite and invalidated the
government's restriction on Christian expression.'1 6 Finally, in Good
News

Club, the

Court

followed

Rosenberger by

finding

the

government's creation of a designated public forum, by articulating a
less rigorous degree of scrutiny, by imbuing that scrutiny with bite, and
by invalidating the governmental policy." 7 In sum, the Court in these
cases might or might not conclude that the government created a
designated public forum, and the Court might or might not apply strict
scrutiny. But ultimately, the Court always reaches the same result:
protecting the promotion of Christian messages and values.
But what happens if the government seeks to restrict the
dissemination or display on its property of a non-Christian (or nontraditional) message? Would not Widmar and its progeny suggest that
the Court should uphold the free expression rights of the non-Christian
speakers in such cases? The neoconservative Justices have avoided this
result by implementing "the recently minted government speech
doctrine."" 8 Basically, in these cases the Court has structured the legal
doctrine so that the Justices can toggle between two approaches: first,
treat the case as a public forum issue and concentrate on whether the
government has justified its restriction of private expression; or second,
treat the case as raising a government speech issue, which allows the
government to escape First Amendment limitations. In Widmar, in
reply to White's dissenting and Stevens's concurring opinions that
doubted the propriety of a free expression public forum approach, the
114
115
116
117
118

Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267-77 (1981).
Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 391-94 (1993).
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 830-33 (1995).
533 U.S. at 106-12.
Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1139 (2009) (Stevens, J., concurring).
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majority stated, "[n]or do we question the right of the University to
make academic judgments as to how best to allocate scarce resources or
'to determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may
be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to
study."' 1 9 Regardless, the Widmar court bypassed the university (or
government) right (or power) to make content-based distinctions
because, according to the majority, the university had created a
designated public forum. Yet, in Rosenberger, the University of
Virginia relied on the Widmar court's acknowledgment of a
governmental right (or power) and argued that it must be allowed to
make "content-based funding decisions," even if doing so entailed
restricting Christian speech. 120 And in fact, the Rosenberger Court
responded by articulating a government speech doctrine: When the
government speaks, sponsors, or funds private speech, then the
government can "regulate the content of what is or is not expressed."'21
Thus, in such situations the government "is entitled to say what it
wishes," without concern for normal First Amendment constraints.122
In the end, the Rosenberger Court concluded that this government
speech doctrine was beside the point. The Court explained that, in the
factual circumstances of the case, "the University does not itself speak
or subsidize transmittal of a message it favors but instead expends funds
to encourage a diversity of views from private speakers." 23 But, then,
how might one distinguish these two types of legally opposed yet
factually similar cases? That is, how might one identify cases where the
government spoke or subsidized private speech-and thus the
government speech doctrine toggled on (while the public forum doctrine
toggled off)-from cases where the government instead encouraged "a
diversity of views from private speakers"-and the government speech
doctrine toggled off (while the public forum doctrine toggled on)? 24
Unfortunately, the Court did not adequately elaborate.1 25
In a more recent case, Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, decided in

2009, the Court confronted this ambiguity lingering between
government speech and public forum cases.126 Pleasant Grove
displayed in its city park several privately donated monuments,
including one showing the Ten Commandments, contributed years
earlier by the Fraternal Order of Eagles. Summum, a religious group,
offered to donate a monument for the park showing its Seven
119 454 U.S. at 276.

120 515 U.S. at 833.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Id.at 834.
124

Id

125 Id

126 129 S. Ct. 1125 (2009).
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Aphorisms (also called the Seven Principles of Creation). The city
refused to accept the monument. Was this a public forum case-where
the government violated the Summum's free expression (or hybrid free
exercise-free expression) rights-or was it a government speech casewhere the government could choose its own message without regard for
First Amendment limits? In response to a petition for a preliminary
injunction, the Court of Appeals held that a public park was a traditional
public forum, that strict scrutiny should therefore be applied, and that
the city was unlikely to satisfy this rigorous standard.127
The Supreme Court reversed. "[T]he display of a permanent
monument in a public park is not a form of expression to which forum
analysis applies," Alito concluded in his opinion for an eight-Justice
majority.128 "Instead, the placement of a permanent monument in a
public park is best viewed as a form of government speech and is
therefore not subject to scrutiny under the Free Speech Clause."1 29 As
Alito explained, under the government speech doctrine, "[t]he Free
Speech Clause restricts government regulation of private speech; it does
not regulate government speech." 1 30 Why, though, was this a
government speech rather than a public forum case? Why switch on the
government speech doctrine and switch off the public forum doctrine?
The Court's primary reason was that a monument is permanent.
"Speakers, no matter how long-winded, eventually come to the end of
their remarks; persons distributing leaflets and carrying signs at some
point tire and go home."l 31 But unlike a speaker who climbs on a
soapbox and starts orating, a monument will endure.132 Monuments
"monopolize the use of the land on which they stand and interfere
permanently with other uses of public space."l 33 For this very reason,
cities and other local governments tend to be selective1 34 : They take
some care before accepting donated monuments 35 because, with the
limited available space, each accepted and displayed monument defines
and communicates "the identity that a city projects to its own residents
and to the outside world." 36
To be sure, Alito's distinction between permanent and temporary
expression seems a reasonable mechanism for identifying government
speech (and thus the applicability of the government speech doctrine).
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
131 Id. at
132 Id.
127
128
129
130

133
134
135
136

1130.
1129.
1131.
1137.

Id

Id.at 1133.
Id. at 1134.
Id
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The ephemerality of a spoken speech (or a distributed leaflet) given in a
public park suggests that many listeners would not associate such a
message with the government, but those same listeners might infer that
a monument represents an accepted governmental viewpoint. Yet, one
should recognize that the Court, parading its neoconservative epaulets,
proclaimed in effect that the government can openly choose to adopt
and display the values, symbols, and viewpoints of some of its citizens
while rejecting those of other citizens-even when those values,
symbols, and viewpoints are specific to certain traditions and religions.
Indeed, given the Court's imprimatur of the government's selective
approval of particular values, one must wonder how the Court would
decide a case with the facts reversed. That is, if (in some science fiction
world) a city already had long displayed a Seven Aphorisms monument
(or a monument from some other minority religion) and then the
Fraternal Order of Eagles offered to donate a Ten Commandments
monument, would the Court allow the city to reject the Ten
Commandments monument because of the government speech doctrine?
Or would the Court conclude that a park was a public forum and that
rejecting the Ten Commandments monument amounted to
unconstitutional content or viewpoint discrimination? Indeed, partly
because of such concerns, the four progressive Justices all expressed
wariness in Summum about the appropriateness and application of the
government speech doctrine (Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer concurred,
while Souter concurred in the judgment only), though they all also
ultimately agreed with the (conservative) majority's conclusion
concerning the constitutionality of the governmental action. 137
CONCLUSION

What are the differences between Smith and the subsequent hybrid
cases? Smith was unquestionably a landmark in free exercise doctrine
and a hallmark of judicial conservatism. But the conservatism was of
the traditionalist form that celebrated judicial restraint and deference to
Once the Court became more neoconservative,
the legislature.
would be appropriate only in certain limited
restraint
judicial
however,
137 Id. at 1140 (Breyer, J., concurring).

In Capitol Square Review & Advisory Board v.

Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995), the Court held that the government could allow a private actor, the
Ku Klux Klan, to display a large Latin (Christian) cross on public property without violating the
Establishment Clause. A majority of Justices focused on the Establishment Clause, but public
forum doctrine clearly influenced the analysis. Id. at 759-63 (Scalia, J., majority opinion).
Scalia's plurality opinion, joined by Rehnquist, Thomas, and Kennedy, concluded: "Religious
expression cannot violate the Establishment Clause where it (1) is purely private and (2) occurs in
a traditional or designated public forum, publicly announced and open to all on equal terms." Id.
at 770 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion).
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circumstances. In other circumstances, a more aggressive and confident
assertion of values seemed appropriate, as demonstrated in the hybrid
free exercise-free expression cases. In those cases, the Court bolstered
the cultivation of traditional religious (read: Christian) values, even
though doing so required a lack of deference to other governmental
institutions (including public schools, universities, and their
administrators).
Another aspect of the hybrid cases highlights this neoconservative
transition on the Court. In all of these cases, the governmental
institutions argued that opening their facilities or providing funding for
Christian organizations would violate the Establishment Clause. The
Court always rejected these arguments, but it did so in different
fashions. For many years, the Court decided Establishment Clause
issues by applying the test from Lemon v. Kurtzman, 138 but neocons
believed that Lemon manifested the so-called wall metaphor: There was
to be a wall of separation between church and state. Neocons such as
Bork rejected the wall metaphor as too antagonistic to religion and
instead advocated for the non-preferentialist position, which supposedly
followed from an originalist reading of the First Amendment. Bork
explained: "[A proscribed] establishment of religion was understood to
be the preference by government of one or more religions over others,"
not the mere preference of religion over irreligion. 139 In other words,
non-preferentialism would allow the government to promote religious
values so long as it did not favor one religion (or religions) over others.
Predictably then, neocons disliked the Lemon test-as a manifestation
of the wall metaphor-and recommended that the Court adopt an
alternative approach more harmonious with non-preferentialism (their
favorite was a coercion test). 140
In Widmar, the pre-Smith hybrid case decided in 1981, the
university raised the Establishment Clause issue. Regardless of the free
exercise-free expression claims and the public forum doctrine, the
university argued that it would violate the First Amendment if it
138 "First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary
effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster
Ian excessive government entanglement with religion."' 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (quoting
Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
139 BORK, SLOUCHING, supra note 32, at 289.
140 First, the "government may not coerce anyone to support or participate in any religion or
its exercise," and second, the government "may not, in the guise of avoiding hostility or callous
indifference, give direct benefits to religion in such a degree that it in fact 'establishes a [state]
religion or religious faith, or tends to do so."' Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 659
(1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring and dissenting) (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678
(1984)). Yet, another test was the endorsement test: First, does the state action create excessive
governmental entanglement with religion, and second, does the state action amount to
governmental endorsement or disapproval of religion? Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687-88 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
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allowed religious organizations to use its facilities. The Court applied
the Lemon test in a straightforward fashion, articulating and applying
each of the three original prongs-purpose, effects, and entanglementthough its analysis focused on the second prong.141 In doing so, the
Court reasoned that opening the university facilities to all student
groups, including religious organizations, would merely provide
incidental benefits to religion.14 2 That is, the primary effect of creating
the public forum would not be to advance religion.143 Therefore, the
Court concluded that the university could satisfy the Lemon test and
would not violate the Establishment Clause.
In the subsequent post-Smith hybrid cases, the Justices showed
hostility toward Lemon and the wall metaphor and sympathy for nonpreferentialism.144 The neoconservative viewpoint was nowhere clearer
than in Thomas's concurrence in Rosenberger. Kennedy's majority
opinion concluded that the university's funding of religious activities
would not violate the Establishment Clause, yet he neither articulated
nor applied any specific Establishment Clause test.145 Instead, he
emphasized that the university's funding program would be religiouslyneutral so long as its benefits extended to "recipients whose ideologies
and viewpoints, including religious ones, are broad and diverse." 46
Thomas agreed with Kennedy's reasoning and conclusion but pressed
the neoconservative vantage. He started with originalism, arguing that
the "right path [of analysis lay] in consulting the original meaning of the
Establishment Clause." 47 Because James Madison played a prominent
role in the drafting of the First Amendment, many constitutional
historians and Supreme Court Justices, Thomas included, have assumed
that Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance 48 provides a window into
the meaning of the Establishment Clause. Madison wrote the Memorial
and Remonstrance in 1785 to oppose a Virginia state legislative bill
proposing a general assessment tax for the support of Christianity.
141 454 U.S. 263, 270-75 (1981).
142 Id at 273.
143 Id.
144 For instance, in Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District, Kennedy's
concurrence criticized the Lemon test (as well as the endorsement test). Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr.
Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 397 (1993) (Kennedy, J., concurring). Scalia,
concurring in the judgment and joined by Thomas, not only denounced the Lemon and
endorsement tests at length, but also asserted the non-preferentialist position: "I would hold,
simply and clearly, that giving Lamb's Chapel nondiscriminatory access to school facilities
cannot violate [the Establishment Clause] because it does not signify state or local embrace of a
particular religious sect." Id at 398-401 (Scalia, J., concurring).
145 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 837-46 (1995).
146 Id at 839.
147 Id at 852 (Thomas, J., concurring).
148 James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, in THE
COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, & ORIGINS 46 (Neil H. Cogan
ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1997) (1785).
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Thomas maintained, quite reasonably, that Madison's argument against
the tax-assessment bill was based (at least in part) on a republican
democratic concept of equality. 14 9 Because, as Thomas phrased it, "the
bill singled out religious entities [that is, Christian religions] for special
benefits," the bill proposed impermissible class legislation that would
have furthered partial or private (or factional) interests rather than the
common good.1 s0 Madison himself wrote (and Thomas quoted): "As
the Bill violates equality by subjecting some to peculiar burdens, so it
violates the same principle, by granting to others peculiar
exemptions."'' Ultimately, in Thomas's view, the best interpretation
of Memorial and Remonstrance supported non-preferentialism: "the

view that the Framers saw the Establishment Clause simply as a
prohibition on governmental preferences for some religious faiths over
others."l 52
Finally, while I have emphasized a transition from traditionalist
conservatism to neoconservatism in constitutional theory and Supreme
Court jurisprudence, I do not mean to suggest that the two forms of
To the contrary, they overlap
conservatism are discontinuous.
a matter of changed emphases
are
more
differences
The
considerably.
than changed kinds. Thus, many scholars and jurists who are primarily
traditionalists can also be categorized as neoconservatives, and vice
versa. Unsurprisingly, then, the earlier and later Borks shared much in
common. For instance, a traditionalist might be just as likely as the
neoconservative Bork to castigate the 1960s counterculture.1 53
Moreover, like the early Bork, the later Bork stressed judicial restraint
and deference to other governmental institutions. Of course, the later
Bork tempered these views of judicial power with a desire to promote
traditional religious values; as I already mentioned, the major change in
Bork's views lay in his attitude toward ethical relativism. The early
Bork might not have liked relativism, but the later Bork feared and
despised it. To a degree, the later Bork here followed the godfather of
neoconservatism, political theorist Leo Strauss. Similar to Strauss,
Bork worried that relativism could ultimately provoke a desperate
populace to turn to an authoritarian Nazi-like demagogue: As society
spiraled downward into hedonism and nihilism, people would be willing
to sacrifice freedom for security.1 54 Bork consequently argued for the
existence of clear moral values that societal institutions could still
regenerate, if only the Supreme Court would allow them to do so. And
149 Id. at 854-55.

150 Id at 855.
151 Id.; Madison, supra note 148, at 48.
152 515 U.S. at 855 (Thomas, J., concurring).
153 BORK, SLOUCHING, supra note 32, at 17-65.
154 Id. at I 1-12, 142; LEO STRAUSS, WHAT IS POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY? AND OTHER STUDIES
26-27 (1959).
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in many ways, the post-Smith neoconservative Court has tried to do just
that.

